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Protecting Informational Privacy in the
Information Society
GEORGE B. TRUBOW*

The centennial of the famous Warren and Brandeis article on
privacy' provides an excellent stimulus to assess the status of privacy
today. The purpose of this article is to examine the contours of
"informational privacy" in the context of modern information and
communications technology.
The notion of "informational privacy," a development of the
1970s, was spawned by the remarkably constant improvement and
growing pervasiveness of the digital computer and electronic data
banks. Increasingly, personal information, that is, information that
can be referenced to an identifiable individual, is the focus of government's information processing as well as the grist for private sector
commerce.
First, this article will briefly review the "computer revolution's"
effect on privacy and examine the nature of informational privacy.
Next, we will consider whether common law or statutes adequately
protect informational privacy with respect to public or private data
bases. Finally, we will suggest some common law and statutory
approaches that may better protect informational privacy without
unduly hampering the fair and beneficial uses of this modern technology.
I.

THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AND INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

The importance of information has been appreciated throughout
history; it has been revered as the key to power, and recognized as
* A.B., J.D., University of Michigan; Professor of Law and Director of the
Center For Informatics Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
Professor Trubow teaches seminars on Information Law and Policy, and Privacy
Law, and has served as general counsel to the Committee on the Right to Privacy,
Executive Office of the President, during the Ford Administration. He is Editor-inChief of the three-volume work, Privacy Law and Practice, published by Matthew
Bender in 1987, and is a member of the Council of the American Bar Association's
Section on Science and Technology.
The author acknowledges and appreciates the assistance of Timothy Skinner, Research
Fellow for the Center for Informatics Law, in the preparation of this article.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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the foundation for rational decisions. 2 With the development of the
digital computer, society's processing and use of this information has
been transformed.' When committed to paper and trapped within the
confines of a manual file, the utility of information is markedly
limited. But, when the information is available in an electronic data
base of virtually endless dimension, open to analysis and processing
at a rate of many millions of functions per second, and capable of
being transmitted through time and space at the speed of light, the
computer transforms the character of the information itself, let alone
the society that employs such technology.
George Orwell's 1984 warned that "Big Brother Is Watching
You." Orwell wrote about television cameras and microphones as the
modern devices of surveillance. The digital computer, however, of
which Orwell was ignorant, is a far more effective surveillance device-both government and the private sector can use it for precisely
this purpose. Though contemporary commentators have raised their
voices in warning, 4 it was Warren and Brandeis who first worried
about the effects of technology upon the enjoyment of privacy.,
Writing that "[riecent inventions and business methods" raised the
need to "secur[e] to the individual ... the right 'to be let alone," ' 6
they warned that "numerous mechanical devices threaten ... that
'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops."' 7 Though they cited "instantaneous photographs" s as a major
culprit, they were very aware that new technology jeopardized the
dignity and personality of the individual. They lacked prescience,
2. Comment, Information on the Federal Government's Electronic Databases:

Is There a First Amendment Right of Access?, 3 SoFTwARE L.J. 65, 70 (1989).

3. Prior to the introduction of the digital computer, "[plersonal information
was difficult to secure and compile, making large quantities of information concerning
one individual unavailable. Computer technology, however, has made these protections part of a lost era." Comment, Intrusions Upon Informational Seclusion in the

Computer Age, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 831, 836 (1984). Although the digital
computer generally provides great benefits to the public, it also "facilitates [the]
inspection of an individual's personal data, and it may prolong the life of the data
beyond the time when it has any real validity in describing the individual." Note,
Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information,

65 TEx. L. REv. 1395, 1399 (1987).
4. See, e.g., A. MILLER, The Assault on the Right to Privacy (1971); A.
WESTiN & M. BAKER, Databanks in the Free Society (1972); HoFFMAN, Computers
and Privacy in the Next Decade (1980). See also, infra notes 9-10 and accompanying

text.

5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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however, regarding the awesome capability of the digital computer of
the future.
These threats have not gone unnoticed. Threats to individual
privacy resulting from the development of automated federal data
bases were documented in a study released by the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973, Records,
Computers and the Rights of Citizens.9 In 1977, the report of the
Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in
an Information Society,'0 recognized not only that we had become an
information society but also that personal privacy was under siege by
both the private sector as well as all levels of government. In the
same year, the United States Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe,"
signaled its awareness of the privacy implications of information
technology, stating:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files.
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social
security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction
of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal
laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of
and
information, much of which is personal in character
2
disclosed.'
if
harmful
or
embarrassing
potentially
A.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR USE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

Probably, the average citizen is only vaguely aware of the ways
in which new technology is being used to collect, manipulate, and
9. Secretary's Advisory Comm. on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, REcoRDs, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS (1973) (OSHEW Publication No. (D)73-94).
10. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society (1977).

11. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). In Whalen v. Roe, patients and physicians brought
an action challenging the constitutionality of a New York statute that required the
creation of a "centralized computer [data base containing] the names and addresses

of all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doctor's prescription, certain drugs

for which there [were] both [legitimate] and [illegal] markets. Id. at 591. The plaintiffs
contended that the statute violated their right to privacy. Id. The United States
Supreme Court upheld the statute as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power.
Id. at 598. The Court noted that the statute provided sufficient security to protect
the privacy of data subjects whose personal health information was contained in the
data base. Id. at 600-02. The Court declined, however, to discuss the future impact
of accumulations of personal information in computer data bases. Id. at 605-06.
12. Id. at 605.
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disseminate personal information. We are conscious of the traffic in
mailing lists that cause us all to be inundated with "junk mail" of
every possible kind, and most have received computer-generated "personal" letters and other solicitations demonstrating that someone has
a surprising amount of information about us. But these manifestations
hardly reveal the extent of the clever uses for a constantly increasing
number of automated data bases that contain detailed personal information.
1.

Computer "Match" Programs

The federal government has undertaken to employ technology to
"match" information from a variety of separate government computer data bases. 3 Originally begun by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to detect welfare fraud, the practice of
"matching" has spread to other agencies, such as the Selective Service
System and the Internal Revenue Service. 4 The former uses "matching" programs to identify those who have failed to register for the
draft; the latter uses matches of governmental and private data bases
to construct personal "lifestyle" characterizations of taxpayers according to categories of spending." Indeed, the activities of federal
agencies in trading information became significant enough for Congress to pass the "Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of
' to
1988 ' 16
regulate these exchanges of information. State and local
governments perform similar "matching," but the states have not yet
passed legislation restricting these practices.
13. "Computer matching" is the incorporation of unrelated computerized files

into a single file. It has been used to identify criminal offenders or compare and
contrast information in order to expose similarities or discrepancies between the two

files. Comment, The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988:
Necessary Relief From the Erosion of the Privacy Act of 1974, 2 SoFTWARE L.J. 391

(1988). The federal government passed The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (Pub. L. No. 100-503 [19881) as an amendment to the Privacy Act of 1974.
The Computer Matching Act limits the exchange of personal information in govern-

ment computer matching programs. Id. at 392.

14. Comment, supra note 13, at 394-95. See generally Comment, Computer
Matching Programs: A Threat to Privacy?, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 143
(1979).

15. See Comment, IRS Computer Data Bank Searches: An Infringement of the
Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Clause, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 153, 154
(1985) (The IRS now has the capacity to pull together bits of information on an
individual from sources throughout the country.).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (note, Construction of 1988 Amendments 1988).

1990:5211

INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

2.

Private Sector Use
The private sector is also developing countless programs to collect
and distribute personal data. The credit reports and detailed financial
information maintained by business organizations will increase immeasurably with the development of the Electronic Funds Transfer
Systems (EFTS).1 7 These EFTS will debit and credit bank accounts by
moving electronic impulses instead of cash or checks. As a medium
of exchange for point-of-sale transactions, EFTS will generate a
constant supply of detailed information that describes exactly when,
where, and for what someone commits financial resources."8 Obviously, anyone with access to that data flow could track the whereabouts of any particular data subject.
3.

The Social Security Number

Informational privacy also has been jeopardized by congressional
action and inaction that, in effect, renders the social security number
(SSN) a form of national identification. 9 Though the SSN was
17. Electronic Fund Transfer Systems (EFTS) are electronic data processing
systems that are used to pay bills or transfer debits or credits. PRIVACY LAw AND
PRACTICE § 3.01[7] (G. Trubow ed. 1990). In its 1977 Final Report, the National
Commission on Electronic Fund Transfer Systems listed several potential threats to
privacy resulting from the use of EFTS. NATIONAL COMUSSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND
TnANsmns, FINAL REPORT: EFT N THE UNITED STATES 20-23 (1977). Most notable
is the increase in the quantity and types of stored information concerning individuals.
Id.
18. Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal
Information, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1395, 1397-98 (1987) [hereinafter "Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information'" ("[E]very time a person uses an automatic
bank teller, a computer collects ... information identifying the person's location,
the date and time of day, and the amount of money requested and received.").
19. Comment, Conceptualizing National Identification: InformationalPrivacy
Rights Protected, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1007 (1986). The creation of the SSN
grew out of the government's need to uniquely label individuals in order to track the
social security benefits to which they were entitled. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, 607-08 (1977). Though initially,
the number was used solely for federal government social security purposes, in 1943,
President Roosevelt issued an executive order encouraging federal agencies to make
greater use of the number. Rotenburg, The NationalID Card:An Executive Summary
7 (1990). Widespread use of the number for identification purposes did not actually
occur, however, until the 1960s. Id. Since that time, the use of the SSN has expanded
dramatically with the improvement of the digital computer. Id. The number is
currently used for processing individual tax returns, registering U.S. securities,
administering senior citizens assistance programs, and as the service number for
American military personnel. Id. Congress requires every United States citizen to
have a SSN. Id. In fact, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires children to be assigned
a number at five years of age. Tax Reform Act of 1986, §§ 6109 and 6676.
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originally intended to serve only as a means of accounting for
contributions to the social security system, increasingly, it is being
used as the device to link various public and private sector data bases
and for identification purposes. 20 Though this may afford convenient
and inexpensive universal identification, it presents alarming privacy
implications. Considering that the personal information in government
files can be combined with information in private sector EFTS, anyone
who knows an individual's SSN can amass a wealth of highly sensitive
information about that individual. Congress undertook to control the
use of the SSN in the Privacy Act of 1974,21 although the then current

uses were "grandfathered," and additional uses have since been
allowed. 2 Nothing more has been done to restrict use of the number,
however.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court's opinion in Whalen v. Roe
contains a relevant observation: "The right to collect and use such
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures."23
Furthermore, Justice Brennan added in his concurring opinion that,
"The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly
increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not
prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the
necessity of some curb on such technology. "2 Because Congress chose
to extend the use of the SSN beyond its originally intended purpose
and requires every taxpayer and dependant to have one, it must
assume the responsibility of guarding informational privacy from
abuse through the use of that number.
20. Comment, Conceptualizing National Identification: Informational Privacy
Rights Protected, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1986). The use of the SSN

has extended far beyond its original purpose. In the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Mississippi, Nevada, and Virginia, an individual's SSN is also his or her driver's

license number. Whole Earth Review, September 22, 1989, at 80. Alabama, Indiana,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West
Virginia, and Wyoming require the SSN to be placed on the driver's license in
addition to the standard driver's license number. Id. Other states display the number
on the license, unless the driver objects. Id. For a discussion of proposals for a
national identification number see Federal Identification Systems: Hearings on S.
1706 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
21. Section 7 of the Privacy Act prohibits the federal government from denying

rights, benefits, or privileges to individuals who refuse to disclose their SSN's.

Wolman v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1980) (Selective Service System's
requirement that draft registrants supply SSN's violated Privacy Act).

22. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

developments and uses of the SSN.
23. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).

24. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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It is clear that new information and communication technologies
pose serious threats to informational privacy in both the public and

private sectors. To what extent do statutes and common law provide

the individual with adequate protection in the midst of these new
technologies?
II. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE PUBUC SECTOR
Three federal statutes are the principal means for protecting
informational privacy in federal data banks: the Privacy Act of 197425
(the Privacy Act), the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection
Act of 19882 (CMPPA), and the Freedom of Information Act of
196627 (FOIA). Though FOIA opens access to federal records, it
exempts from disclosure information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.2 A recent United States Supreme Court
case interpreting FOIA recognizes the impact of technology and
provides significant protection for informational privacy. In United
States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press,29 the Court was called upon to decide whether the FBI's
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (note, Congressional Findings and
Statement of Purpose 1988).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (note, Construction of 1988 Amendments 1988).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
29. 109 S.Ct. 1468 (1989). In United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether a compilation of criminal history information in a "rap sheet" could give
rise to an unwarranted invasion of privacy under FOIA exemption 7(C) even though
the bits of information contained within the data bases were derived from public
sources. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1476 (1989). Exemption 7(C) allows an agency to withhold an
investigatory record if its release would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). This exemption has been interpreted
broadly to protect information concerning marital status, medical conditions, welfare
recipient's names and benefits. Cohen v. E.P.A., 575 F. Supp. 425, 429 (D.D.C.
1983).
In discussing the applicability of exemption 7(C) in Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, the Court addressed the need to balance the privacy interest
in withholding the rap sheets against the public 'interest in its release. United States
Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1476
(1989). The Court divided the case into several areas of focus. First, they addressed
whether the data subject, Charles Medico, had any "personal privacy" interest in
having his rap sheet remain undisclosed. Id. The Court noted that there are two
different kinds of interests involved when protecting privacy: the interest of the
individual in "avoiding the disclosure of personal matters, and ... the interest in
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disclosure of a "rap sheet" (a compilation of criminal history information derived from public document sources) could constitute an
invasion of privacy under the FOIA. The Court held that the information was properly withheld from disclosure, reasoning that "the
power of compilations to affect personal privacy . .. outstrips the
combined power of the bits of information contained within." 3 0 In
effect, the Court said that the whole was greater than the sum of its
parts; though each individual item of information was available
elsewhere in a public record, since it had all been assembled into a
compilation or profile, the whole could display a great deal about an
individual and thus infringe upon a privacy interest. 3 ' The Court also
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. In this case, the
Court focused on the interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters. Id.
The Court quickly drew a distinction between "records that might be found
after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations
throughout the country..." and those that are contained in a single clearinghouse
such as a computer database. Id. at 1477. They supported this distinction by pointing
to the myriad of federal regulations that limit the circumstances under which rap
sheet information may be disclosed. Id. These statutes were seen as evidence of
congressional intent that such compilations remain private. Id. The Court stated that
"the power of compilations to affect personal privacy . . . outstrips the combined

power of the bits of information contained within." Id. They also cited the provisions
of FOIA which require that identifying information be removed from requested
materials prior to disclosure as evidence that Congress did not intend the records of
private citizens to be subject to disclosure. Id. at 1477-78.
Additionally, the Court cited the Privacy Act as support for the idea that a
stronger privacy interest inheres in the compilation of computerized information. Id.
at 1478. Though the Privacy Act exempts information subject to disclosure under
FOIA, the Court stated that the Act was still evidence of congressional concern over
centralized data bases. Id.
The Court praised the practice of redacting or removing identifying information
from personal summaries prior to disclosure of the documents. Id. at 1479. They
were well aware, however, that even if the data subject's name is removed from the
compilation, by virtue of the information itself, it is still possible for the information
to be linked to the data subject. Id. In these situations, the Court emphasized,
nondisclosure is the best means of protecting the individual privacy interest. Id.
The Court then addressed the reporter's contention that the public had an
interest in Medico because of his dealings with a corrupt congressman and the
Department of Defense ("DoD"). Id. at 1482. The Court rejected these arguments,
stating that the documents would reveal nothing about the "Congressman's behavior.
[N]or would it tell us anything about the conduct of the Department of Defense
...." Id. (emphasis in original). Though the Court conceded that Medico may be

of interest in a news story, it stated that disclosing his rap sheet would go beyond
the intent of Congress in drafting FOIA. Id.
30. Id. at 1477.
31. Id. at 1476-77. "Merely because [information] can be found in the public
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noted that the purpose of FOIA was to reveal information about
government operations, not the personal history of a private person.32
The Court's approach would markedly enhance privacy if applied
to other federal data bases containing personal information that
discloses a great deal about the individual but not very much about
the government itself. The Reporters Committee decision indicates
that the Supreme Court is balancing the competing FOIA interests in
a way that protects privacy while allowing access to information that
illuminates government practices. Although the FOIA recognizes a privacy interest, the Privacy Act
of 1974 is the principal federal law that protects personal information.
This Act regulates the information practices of federal agencies by
providing some protection for informational privacy. A major oversight in the creation of the Act was that its drafters did not anticipate
the computer matching programs such as were described above. This
matter was later addressed by the CMPPA, which establishes mechanisms and procedures to monitor matching activities. However,
even with the combined effect of these two acts, a significant problem
record does not mean that it should receive widespread publicity if it does not involve
a matter of public concern." Id. at 1476 n. 15 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed.
1984)).
It must be noted that the Ohio Supreme Court, in virtually the same situation,
held otherwise and did not find a privacy interest in such information. In State, ex
rel. Cincinnati Post v. Schweikert, 38 Ohio St. 3d 170, 527 N.E.2d 1230 (1988), a
newspaper was refused access to reports compiled by the court administrator for city
municipal courts and courts of common pleas which are used by judges in determining
whether to reduce jail sentences in assessing jail overcrowding. Id. These reports
identify the charges brought against defendants assigned to each judge; the age, sex,
and race of each defendant; and the bond amount and whether it was made. Id. at
171, 527 N.E.2d at 1231. The record also contains the defendant's "prior convictions,
violent history, drug, alcohol, or psychiatric history . . ." and probation violation
history as well as a statement of the number of days a defendant has served in jail.
Id.
The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the state's Public Records Law does
not exempt from disclosure compilations of information derived from public records.
Id. at 172-74, 527 N.E.2d at 1232-33. The court stated that the statute does not
require members of the public to exhaust their time, energy, and resources to gather
information that is already available in compact form. Id. at 173-74, 527 N.E.2d at
1233. In reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to take into account the
severe privacy threats surrounding the release of such a compilation. Instead, the
court opted for a convenience approach without seriously weighing the potential
harm of the bits of information contained within the dossier.
32. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1482 (1989).
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remains: no single federal agency is vested with the overall responsi-

bility of safeguarding informational privacy with respect to federal
records.

Though the CMPPA requires the creation of a data protection
board within each agency that performs match programs, no provision
exists for the coordination of privacy policy throughout the federal
establishment. The Office of Management and Budget has nominal
responsibility for the oversight of the Privacy Act, but it can provide
only limited privacy protection.3 3 Therefore, Congress should establish
a quasi-independent federal agency with the authority and resources
to monitor and protect informational privacy.3
State and local governments should provide parallel protection
of their own data bases. Almost every state has public record laws

which replicate the federal FOIA or provide public access to certain

data bases or records."5 If the rationale of the Reporters Committee

33. Bass & Plocher, Strengthening Federal Information Policy: Opportunities
L.J. 413, 430 (1989) ("Privacy ... has been
and Realities at OMB, 3 SOFTWA
turned inside out by OMB's shortsighted interest in easing restrictions on government
use of information about individuals.").
34. Though the Privacy Act was originally intended to protect informational
privacy, the enforcement, oversight, and scope of the Act are inadequate. See
Comment, Computer Matching Programs: A Threat to Privacy?, 15 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 143, 160 (1979). The Act has been criticized because it only applies to
the federal government, failing to reach state governments and private parties. Id.
The Act is also riddled with broad exceptions that severely limit its usefulness. Id. at
160-61. For an extended discussion of the authority and functions of such an
independent agency, see Trubow, Watching the Watchers: The Coordination of
FederalPrivacy Policy, 3 SoFrwARB L.J. 391 (1989).
35. ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1975 & Supp. 1989); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.100
(1983); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.1343 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-18-102
(1987); CAL. GoVElNENT CODE § 6253 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 24-72-201 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-193 (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 10112 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 201 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01
(West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-805c (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, para. 203
(1989); IND. CODE § 5-14-3-3 (1989); IowA CODE ANN. § 68A.2 (West 1973); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-216 (1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.872 (Baldwin 1986); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:31 (West 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1964);
MD. STATE GOVERNMENT CODE ANN. § 10-612 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
66A, § 1-3 (West 1988); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 15.233 (West 1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 13.03 (West 1988); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 25-51-3 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102, 104 (1990); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 84-712 (1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 239.010 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (1977 & Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2 (West 1989);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-8 (1988); N.Y. PUBLIC OFECEas LAW § 87 (McKinney 1988
& Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978);
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case is followed in the administration of state FOIAs and if each state
assigns a privacy protection role to a specific agency, then informational privacy will receive a better measure of protection in the
governmental environment. This matter rests with the state courts and
legislatures. A public outcry on behalf of individual privacy could
6
surely attract attention to the need for adequate privacy protection.1
III.

PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

As previously discussed, the private sector maintains a myriad of
personal information data bases, and more are being created every
day. Probably the most pervasive collections are maintained by credit
bureaus. The Fair Credit Reporting Act" (FCRA) regulates the practices of these bureaus to some extent, but it does not significantly
38
limit the sale or exchange of the personal information.
The information maintained by banks and other financial institutions is protected from inquiries by the federal government through
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43(B) (Page 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.2
(West 1988 & Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.420 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

65, § 66.2 (Purdon 1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-43-7 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 304-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-2 (1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 107-503 (1987); TEX. [GovERNMENT] CODE ANN. § 6252-17a (Vernon
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-66 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 315 (1985); VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.1-342 (1987 & Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.290
(Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-1 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.21 (West 1986
&.Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 9-692.1 (1975).
36. For example, a group of Illinois citizens who believe the practice of
telemarketing violates their right to privacy have decided not to wait for the legislature
to curb such practices. This organization, "Private Citizen," has enlisted over one
thousand members in its one year existence. Parsons, Naperville Group Wants
Telemarketers to Buzz Off, Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1990 § 2, at 1. The group
distributes catalogs to telemarketing organizations containing the names of its members who do not want to be solicited by telemarketers. Id. In addition to this catalog,
the group also notifies the telemarketers that the group will charge such organizations
for the use of their time on the telephone. Id. The group's members have been
successful in receiving modest judgments from telemarketers who call them against
their wishes. Id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982). The purpose of the FCRA was to curb privacy
abuses in the private sector. Freedman, The Right of Privacy in the Age of Computer
Dataand Processing, 13 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1361, 1375 (1982). The Act requires that
consumers be notified whenever a credit report is used as the basis of rejecting their
request for some benefit. Id.
38. For a revealing account of privacy invasions in the credit report industry,
see Rothfeder, Is Nothing Private?: Computers Hold Lots of Data On You-And
There are Few Limits On Its Use, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 74.
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the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.19 Few states have parallel
laws to deal with inquiries to financial institutions from state or local
government agencies, and none restrict the sale of these data bases to
the private sector. Is the common law more effective in vindicating
the belief of Warren and Brandeis?
The invasive conduct that disturbed Warren and Brandeis was
the "injurious disclosure as to private matters"' 4 and "the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons.' '4 These forms of
conduct appear in two of the four branches of a right to privacy tort
later articulated by Professor Prosser: public disclosure of private
facts and appropriation of identity. 42 Prosser's classification became
the basis for the privacy torts as set forth in the Restatement (Second)
43
of Torts.
IV.

PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE FACT

Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses
"Publicity Given to Private Life" when the matter published is
"highly offensive to a reasonable person" 44 and "not of legitimate
concern to the public. '4 The Restatement, as well as the common
law, have accepted Warren and Brandeis' belief that "[tihe truth of
the matter published does not afford a defence." 46 This concept is in
direct contrast to the truth defense available in defamation law. In
applying the tort, the courts have reduced its usefulness by interpreting
"public concern" in broad terms; and "newsworthiness," which often
is little more than curiosity, seems to meet the test. 47 Most states
39. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982). The Right to Financial Privacy Act was designed
to give data subjects some control over the federal government's access to their
financial records. PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 3.03[41[a] (G.Trubow ed. 1990).
Under -the Act, most customer record disclosures to federal government agencies
require the consent of the data subject. Id. The Act, however, applies only to federal
government agencies and is, therefore, inapplicable to state and local governments
and private entities. Id.
40. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 204.
41. Id. at 195.
42. See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

43.

117 (5th ed. 1984).
652A (1977).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

44. Id. at § 652D(a).
45. Id. at § 652D(b).
46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 218.
47. The test for that which constitutes a "public concern" has been defined as
whether a reasonable member of the public with decent standards would determine
that he or she has no concern in the matter. Virgil v. Time, 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th
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recognize this privacy tort, though some do not. 48 States that do not

recognize the tort often misconstrue the Prosser formulation.
For example, in Hall v. Post,49 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina refused to recognize this branch of the privacy tort. A
newspaper had printed a series of articles about a former carnival
worker who sought to find a daughter she had abandoned seventeen
years earlier. 0 The newspaper reported that the child had been adopted
after the abandonment, and revealed the identity and location of the
child and the adoptive mother, both of whom fled their home to
avoid the public attention the articles generated.5'
The North Carolina court's opinion reflected little concern for
the privacy of the adoptive mother or the child. Instead, the court
focused on the first amendment ramifications of restricting the press'
effort to reveal the information on the ground that it was of public
2
5

interest.

The Supreme Court, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.," gave better insight into the nature of "public interCir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). The Virgil court determined that "The
line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which
the public is entitled .... ." Id.
48. Thirty-six states have recognized the publication of private facts tort.
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 365-66 (1983). Indiana, Montana, and
Washington have not expressly adopted or rejected the tort. Id. at 366. Only
Nebraska, New York, Utah, and Virginia have expressly rejected the private facts
tort. Id. at 366-67. The federal courts located in New Hampshire, Vermont, and
West Virginia have recognized the private facts tort, but the state courts in those
jurisdictions have not yet decided the issue. Id. at 367.
49. 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. It should be noted that the Hall court did attempt to provide an alternative
to the publication of private fact tort. The court noted that it was theoretically
possible that a jury could find that a cause of action exists for intentional infliction
of emotional distress on the same facts as an action for the publication of private
fact. Id. at 254, 372 N.E.2d at 716. The court failed to mention, however, that the
emotional distress tort requires a showing of actual damage while publication itself
is generally sufficient for an action based on disclosure of private fact. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
53. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), a construction company brought suit against a credit
reporting agency claiming that the agency had defamed it by circulating an inaccurate
credit report to plaintiff's creditors that "grossly misrepresented respondent's assets
and liabilities." Id. at 751. Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell determined that
"the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation
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est," at least in terms of the first amendment. The Court concluded
that a credit report distributed for commercial purposes was not a
matter of public interest, even though the report contained information regarding bankruptcy and net worth.5 4 Self-governance and the
public's safety and welfare are the focus of "public interest," and
these matters are not within the purview of commercial data bases
containing personal information." This is a far better touchstone of
public interest than the highly subjective "newsworthiness" standard
because it places emphasis on importance to the public rather than
on a particular individual's curiosity.
A.

BARRIERS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIVATE ACT TORT

A variety of other barriers have hampered the development of
the publicity of private fact tort. First, because the tort focuses on
publication, which has been equated with speech, it may run afoul of
the first amendment, as illustrated by the HaP6 case. The root of this
problem lies in the fact that the Supreme Court extended the reach
[must be weighed] against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type of
expression." Id. at 757.
54. Id. at 762. The information in this credit report was inaccurate. The court
noted, however, that not all credit reports will receive reduced first amendment
protection. Id. at 762 n.8. "[T]he report's 'content, form, and context' determine
the degree of first amendment protection that such a report is afforded. Id.
55. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides insight into the types of matters
that constitute legitimate public concern. It states:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account must
be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last
analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores. The line
is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to
which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying
into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the
public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment h (1977).
With respect to commercial databases, the court in Tureen v. Equifax, Inc.,
571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978), made the following relevant observation:
In today's mobile society, there is a legitimate business need for consumer
reports, which serve.., important public functions .... In order to make
informed judgments in these matters, it may be necessary for the decision
maker to have information which normally would be considered private,
provided the information is legitimately related to a legitimate purpose of
the decision maker. In such a case, the public interest provides the defendant
a shield which is similar in principle to qualified privilege in libel.
Id. at 416.
56. Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988).
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of the first amendment to defamation, a tort that is based upon the
7
publication of false fact.
The facts of concern in informational privacy are generally true,
and the Court has not completely resolved the issue of when the first
amendment will protect the publication of true facts that relate to
private affairs. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address

this issue in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,58 when they considered
57. See

PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 1.04[6] (G. Trubow ed. 1990), for a

discussion of the effect of the application of the defenses in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to the privacy torts.
58. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975), a deceased rape victim's father brought a civil action against a television
station alleging a private cause of action for invasion of privacy arising from a
Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to publish the name of a rape victim. Id.
at 471-74. The name had been published in connection with news stories about the
trial of the six defendants charged with raping and murdering the daughter. Id. The
reporter assigned to cover the trial stated that he received his information by attending
all but the first 30 minutes of the first morning of the trial. Id. at 472 n. 1.
In its analysis, the Court began by recognizing the:
great responsibility . . . placed upon the news media to report fully and
accurately the proceedings of government[;] and official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations
....
With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the
press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice ....
The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial
proceedings arising from the prosecutions, however, are without question
events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the
responsibility of the press to report the operations of government.
Id. at 491-2.
The Court noted that the Warren and Brandeis article proposed that privacy
actions would be limited in the same manner as libel and slander actions if the
publication was privileged: "[T]he right to privacy is not invaded by any publication
made in a court of justice . . . and (at least in many jurisdictions) reports of any
such proceedings would in some measure be accorded a like privilege." Id. at 493
(citing Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAgv. L. Rv. 193, 216-17
(1890)). The Cox Court also noted that the tentative drafts provided in the comments
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts state that a person would not be liable for
accessing or publishing information in public records.
The Cox Court emphasized this point in stating:
[E]ven the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that
the interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears
on the public record. The conclusion is compelling when viewed in terms of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and in light of the public interest in
a vigorous press ....
By placing the information in the public domain on official court records, the
State must presume to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being
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whether a newspaper could be liable for violating a rape shield statute
by publishing the name of a rape victim that had been found in a
public record. However, the Cox Court sidestepped the first amendment question by finding that the information was not private.5 9 This
author suggests that the Greenmoss6° decision provides a workable
test that could be applied in determining when truthful information
is of private, not public, concern.
The Cox case introduced a second obstacle to the utility of the
private fact tort: whether personal information in a public record can
be considered private information. Though on the facts presented in
Cox the Court appropriately said no, the Reporters Committee6 case
gave a different result in the context of FOIA. In Cox, the disclosure
was of a single fact obtained directly from an indictment, the public
record. In Reporters Committee, the plaintiff sought disclosure of a
served. Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with
the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting
of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the press to publish
that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government
in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business. In
preserving that form of government the First and Fourteenth Amendments command
nothing less than that the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of
truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975).
59. Id. Similarly, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989), the United
States Supreme Court decided whether the first amendment is violated if damages
are imposed on a newspaper for printing a rape victim's name pursuant to information
legally obtained. In Florida Star, a rape victim brought suit against a newspaper for
publishing her name that a reporter obtained from a publicly released police report.
Id. at 2605-6. The Florida rape shield statute allowed the imposition of civil damages
against newspapers that revealed this information. Id. at 2605. The Court rejected
the plaintiff's claim, noting that though the state's interests in protecting the privacy
of sexual assault victims are significant, imposing liability is not the best means to
advance those interests. Id. at 2610. The Court placed great reliance on the fact that
the government itself provided the information to the media; therefore, it had the
opportunity, but did not guard against its dissemination. Id. at 2611-12. The Court
stated that when the government fails to police itself, it cannot punish the media for
reporting truthful accounts of the information the government distributes. Id. The
information dissemination, without qualification, led the recipients to believe printing
it was lawful. Id. at 2612. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the statute only
punishes media, not those who distribute such information by word of mouth. Id.
at 2612-13. State attempts to protect rape victims in the name of privacy requires an
even-handed approach. Id. at 2613. It must apply equally to the small-time as well
as the big-time disseminator. Id.
60. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
61. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 109 S. Ct. 1498 (1989).
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"rap sheet," a compilation of information that had been derived in
turn from a series of public records. Nevertheless, in other contexts,
personal information has lost its confidential nature when found in
some public record.
A third problem in applying the private facts tort lies in the
required scope of disclosure. A relatively widespread publication of
the information is required to constitute an invasion of the privacy
interest, 62 unlike defamation wherein disclosure to one other than the
data subject is sufficient. Though this requirement was not contemplated in the Warren and Brandeis formulation nor in Prosser's early
explication, the courts routinely accept such a limitation. Because the
"publication" of commercial data maintained in computer data bases
is routinely made to a small group, often one at a time, it may not
6 a
satisfy this requirement .
Another pervasive problem in applying the private fact tort is the
requirement that the information disclosed be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. The courts frequently deny the tort's application
when the information, though private and perhaps not of public
interest, is not in itself deemed harmful or offensive. 4 Most of the
information stored in commercial computer files is not offensive or
embarrassing, even though it does provide a detailed description of
an individual's behavior, tastes, and values.
62. See, e.g., Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 314 S.E.2d 39 (S.C. Ct. App.
1984) (In tort actions arising out of the publication of private facts, communication
to a single individual or small group of individuals is insufficient.).
63. Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978). In the Tureen case,
a majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that
information disseminated by a credit bureau was insufficient publication to support
a claim for disclosure of private fact. In dissent, however, Judge Heaney rejected
this contention. Judge Heaney stated that, "The collection and retention of personal
information about a particular consumer by a commercial information broker, such
as Equifax makes the dissemination of that information sufficiently likely as to meet
any reasonable requirement of 'publicity.' " Id. at 420. He further stated that, "[t]he
dissemination of private information by a commercial credit broker to insurance
companies, banks and other customers requesting such information is no less 'public'
than the posting of a debt in a creditor's shop window." Id. at 421.
64. See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.
1989) (television documentary revealing rape victim's first name and picture of her
residence not embarrassing enough so as to be deemed "highly offensive" for
purposes of tort involving disclosure of private facts); Thomason v. Times-Journal,
Inc., 190 Ga. App. 601, 379 S.E.2d 551 (1989) (newspaper's erroneous printing of
live plaintiff's obituary not so highly "offensive and objectionable to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities" as to give rise to liability for tort of disclosure of
private facts).
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Finally, even when the information is "highly offensive," the
courts often deny the remedy on the grounds of the conditional
privileges adopted from defamation law. 65 Because these disclosures
are regarded as speech, the courts have been quick to justify them.
Consequently, the privileges, coupled with the obstacles discussed
above, have virtually eliminated the disclosure of private facts tort as
an adequate remedy for violations of informational privacy, even in
the commercial environment.
V.

APPROPRIATION OF NAME, LIKENESS, OR PERSONALITY

Most of the incursions on informational privacy in the private
sector result from commercial use of data. As indicated previously,
there is constant growth in the sale of personal information; the tort
"appropriation of name or likeness''"66 for a commercial purpose
could provide an appropriate remedy. A compelling argument can be
made that a collection of personal information sold as a dossier or
profile violates the appropriation tort that had been described by
Prosser as "appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality for commercial use." '67 When this tort is alleged, in most instances, the appropriation has been accomplished by associating the
plaintiff's personality with an advertisement for the sale of goods or
services or to link him with a particular cause or viewpoint. When
dossiers and profiles maintained by credit bureaus and other such
65. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S.Ct. 2603 (1989) (disclosure of rape
victim's name not compensable because publicly disclosed by the government); Zinda
v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 149 Wis. 2d 913, 440 N.W.2d 548, 553 (1989) (employer
who published reasons for plaintiff's termination in company newsletter protected by
conditional privilege because "[e]mployees have a legitimate interest in knowing the
reasons a fellow employee was discharged.").
66. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). A distinction must be
noted between the appropriation tort and the "right of publicity," which is a relatively
new tort that is gaining ground by statute and common law. This new tort is
recognized as having grown out of the appropriation tort. It was first introduced in
the 1953 case of Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1953). Its primary purpose is to protect public figures and to provide
them with a descendible and assignable right. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954). The publicity right differs from the appropriation right, however, to the extent that the appropriation right is a personal right
that does not survive the person while the publicity right is both assignable and
inheritable. Id. In the context of informational privacy, the typical private person
needs protection to guard against privacy invasions only while living. Therefore, the
appropriation tort should suffice because, in that context, one's privacy may be
regarded as complete upon death.
67. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 97 (2d ed. 1955).
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agencies are sold, the subject's personality is certainly being used for
a commercial purpose. Similarly, when a mailing list is sold and that
list identifies potential customers or individuals likely to support or
contribute to a particular cause, a part of the individual's personality,
not merely his name, is being appropriated for commercial gain.
A similar argument was made in the 1975 Ohio case of Shibley
v. Time, Inc.. 8 In Shibley, the plaintiff alleged that Time Magazine's
practice of selling and renting subscription lists to direct mail advertisers constituted an appropriation and exploitation of his personality. 69 The court rejected this argument mainly because the Ohio
legislature had passed a statute that expressly condoned these practices. But, in noting the hesitance to allow claims based on a desire
to avoid receiving "junk mail, ' 7 0 the Ohio court misinterpreted the
plaintiff's assertion. The plaintiff did not complain that he was
receiving unwanted correspondence from the purchasers of the mailing
lists. Instead, he was claiming that his name was being sold without
his consent, thus causing an unwanted appropriation of his personality.
Surely, the requirement of commercial use encompasses the sale
of mailing lists, credit reports, or detailed records of an individual's
purchasing history. In the common setting of an endorsement, for
instance, the plaintiff's personality has been appropriated to manipulate others-that is, to encourage others to accept a particular
product, service, or idea because of the data subject's association with
it. 7 1 In the present reference, the personality profile is used to permit
others to manipulate the data subject. In either case, it is the individual's persona that is the subject of the use, and the appropriation
tort ought to apply.
The appropriation tort avoids a conflict with the first amendment.
The gravamen of this tort is not speech as typified by publication; it
is the act of appropriation or use that demonstrates control over the
information. Conventional wisdom, at least in the degree to which
the Restatement represents convention, recognizes this distinction. 72
68. 45 Ohio App.2d 69, 341 N.E.2d 337 (1975).
69. Id.

70. Id. at 73, 341 N.E.2d at 339.
71. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoades, Inc., 492 A.2d
580 (D.C. 1985); Cox Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 173 Ga.App. 812, 328 S.E.2d
384 (1985).
72. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes the distinction between the
appropriation tort and the privacy torts protecting publicity of private fact and false
light. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). Though, in applying all of
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Additionally, the use of the appropriation tort avoids the defense
of "public interest" that applies to publications of private fact.
Indeed, it is the very fact of a "public interest" that encourages the
commercial appropriation.
The individual's personality, as it is described by the behavior
and values evidenced in the commercial environment, is clearly the
subject of the dossier. The dissemination of this information directly
affects the way the individual is perceived and received by other
members of the community. Every time a credit report or other
personal-information dossier is sold, the individual's control over his
persona is diminished. Though the individual is probably unaware
when a compilation has been created, or is being sold," this happens
constantly with very few restrictions. 74 Is there "harm" to the individual in these commercial practices?
For a long time, "Madison Avenue" has been analyzing the
public so as to predict the behavior of target segments. Whether to
promote products or gather votes on a candidate or issue, clearly the
goal is to learn how to affect the behavior of others-to manipulate
consumers or voters. "Target marketing" seeks constantly to narrow
and particularize the groups of people who are the aim of political or
commercial attention. It has been suggested that this compilation and
the privacy torts, the Restatement emphasizes the importance of protecting personal
feelings, it distinguishes the appropriation tort because the interest protected there is
in the nature of a property right. Id. at comment a. Therefore, unlike the torts of
publicity given to private fact and false light, there is no widespread publicity
requirement. Id. at § 652C. The only notable restriction on recovery under the
appropriation tort is incidental use. Id. at comment d. The relevant portion of
comment d states as follows:
No one has the right to object merely because his name or his appearance
is brought before the public, since neither is in any way a private matter
and both are open to public observation. It is only when the publicity is
given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the
commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that
the right of privacy is invaded.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is important to note that incidental use as defined in comment d of section
652C differs from the limitation on matters deemed to be of a "legitimate public
interest" in section 652F. Section 652F provides a privilege to publish matters of
public interest. Id. at § 652F.
73. Linowes, Must PersonalPrivacy Die in the Computer Age?, 65 A.B.A. J.

1181, 1183-4 (1979) (discussing the fact that individuals are generally unaware that
such information is used in decision-making).
74. RUBIN, Tin COMPUTER AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 64 (1988) ("The sad fact
of the matter is that the regular practice of credit reporting bureaus is to sell reports
to anyone that claims a legitimate need for the information.").

INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

1990:521]

dissemination of personal information could lead to a compulsion to
avoid taking risks, thus creating a conformist, robotic public seeking
to avoid exposure to the risks inherent in functioning in society.7"
Without the need to subscribe to such a theory it is, nevertheless,
reasonable to fear the privacy risks and to guard individuals from
commercial trafficking in their personalities without their knowledge
or notice of the purposes at hand.
To provide some ability to monitor these transactions, the FCRA7 6
should be amended to require notice to the individual when information about him has been supplied to another. Currently, the FCRA
requires that notice be given to the data subject only when the credit
report is used adversely in connection with credit, employment, or
insurance decisions. 77 Amending the Act will give data subjects a
greater degree of control over information about themselves. The
importance of control was recognized by Warren and Brandeis: "The
common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall
be communicated to others." 78 The need for some measure of control
is even more important when personal information may be used
covertly to manipulate the data subject.
In addition to amending FCRA, to the extent that the commercial
use of dossiers and mailing lists is permitted, it seems fair that those
who sell this information should be required to contribute some
portion of the proceeds (perhaps twenty percent) to the social security
accounts of the data subjects involved. It is interesting to note that
the private sector understands the value of invading privacy since the
market easily fixes prices for credit reports and mailing lists. To
require compensation for routine invasions of privacy seems entirely
appropriate.
VI.

SUMMARY OF PRIVACY PROTECTION PROPOSALS

Now that we have wandered through a discussion, diagnosing ills
and considering cures, a summary of what has been proposed seems
inorder.
75. Note, Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, supra note 18,

at 1396.

76. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982). For a discussion of FCRA see supra text
accompanying notes 38-39.
77. Id. at § 1681m(a).
78. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198. This notion of control was also
emphasized in Allen Westin's treatise. A. WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 159, 169210 (1970).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

1. Federal and state governments should designate a single
agency with the authority and resources to monitor and enforce
informational privacy policies. A concern for privacy is the natural
enemy of a government bureaucrat who pursues agency objectives
with costs and efficiency in mind. Technological benefits can be
enjoyed without destroying informational privacy, but an official with
clout must be charged with that responsibility.
2. Congress should act to protect the social security number,
especially from its use as an identifier that links information in diverse
commercial record systems without the knowledge or consent of the
individual. Regulating matches by federal agencies through the CMPPA
is simply not enough.
3. The courts must be urged to consider the rationale suggested
in Whalen v. Roe and articulated in the Reporters Committee case.
Unless we recognize how technology can be used to invade privacy
and thereafter constrain any invasion, little privacy will survive the
"computer revolution."
4. Litigants should arm themselves with the appropriation tort
as a viable and persuasive common law response to violations of
informational privacy in the commercial environment.
5. The FCRA should be amended to: (a) provide notice to
individuals whenever their dossier has been supplied, and (b) to require
that a portion (we suggest twenty-percent) of gross revenues from
such transactions be deposited in the subject's social security account.
6. Citizens, arise! A major reason more has not been done to
protect informational privacy is because a constituency is not mobilized. 79 Professional and civic organizations, political activists, consumer groups, and concerned citizens should all join a hue and cry
to protect informational privacy.
Implementation of any part of the package will bring a significant
improvement to informational privacy protection. Perhaps it is too
much to hope that all is accomplished, but who is to say?

79. The 1981 Symposium on Personal Privacy and Information Technology

reached this same conclusion in its report on current practices for information

dissemination and control. Report on the National Symposium on Personal Privacy
and Information Technology 5-6 (1981).

